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AIRLINE PASSENGER PROFILING SYSTEMS 
AFTER 9/11: PERSONAL PRIVACY VERSUS 
NATIONAL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
As the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed, the 
“freedom to travel throughout the United States 
has long been recognized as a basic right under 
the Constitution.”1 Not only is the freedom to 
travel a basic right of American law, but the 
“[c]onstitutional right to interstate travel is 
virtually unqualifi ed.”2 A recent and sustained 
marketing campaign by low-cost carrier 
Southwest Airlines — “You are now free to move 
about the country” — underscores the liberty 
to air travel that Americans enjoy. Wealthier 
Americans were the primary passengers of early 
airlines. Modern deregulated air travel is more 
democratic and accessible. Today, anybody, 
from anywhere, can fly commercially. This 
freedom has been complicated by the national 
trauma caused by the events of Sept. 11, 2001, 
however.
Sept. 11 changed the paradigm of commercial 
airline security. As stated by a former strategy 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Karber, 
2001-2002), “the survival of the plane and its 
occupants is no longer the ultimate objective in a 
situation involving assailants attempting to seize 
control of the aircraft.” Whatever the novelty 
of the tactics of Sept. 11, the societal effects of 
Sept. 11 are anything but novel. The legacy of 
Sept. 11 is a campaign to determine and isolate 
“them” from “us.” Ironically, in the course of 
rooting out the proverbial enemy among us, the 
federal government’s investigative energies are 
directed internally to “us.”
Any efforts by the federal government to 
bolster national security presents a fundamental 
tension in American society between the 
practical need for security and the societal 
promise of liberty (AuBuchon, 1999; Dowley, 
2002; Haas, 2004). Some Americans receive 
anti-terrorism measures as necessary to protect 
not just their freedoms, but their very lives. 
Other Americans resist well-intentioned federal 
efforts to promote security at the expense of 
personal freedoms. These Americans charge 
that hard-won constitutional protections must 
not be dismissed too easily as abstractions or 
legal niceties even, or especially, in the face 
of tangible threats by anti-democracy regimes. 
As a result of Sept. 11, the modern forum of 
this historic debate is the national commercial 
aviation system.
Specifically, on August 26, 2004, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
introduced its plan for a comprehensive 
This paper reviews the Transportation Security Administration’s forthcoming computerized profi ling 
system called “Secure Flight.” Secure Flight is the latest generation of so-called “computer assisted 
passenger pre-screening systems.” Such systems invite considerable privacy and civil liberty con-
cerns, evoking references to an Orwellian society. This article confronts the central legal, political, 
and social tension borne of profi ling systems such as Secure Flight, namely the conflict between the 
ideal of a “right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890) relative to the post-Sept. 11 ultimatum 
of former American Airlines Chairman and CEO Robert L. Crandall (2002): “You want to travel 
on the airline system? You give up your privacy. You don’t want to give up your privacy?  Don’t fly. 
Your privacy isn’t equal to the safety of the rest of us.”
by Timothy M. Ravich
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computerized profi ling system called “Secure 
Flight.” Scheduled to launch in the summer of 
2005, Secure Flight will empower the federal 
government to assess the security risk(s) of 
domestic (not international) airline passengers. 
Under Secure Flight, airlines are obligated to 
furnish the TSA with passenger name records 
(PNR) for each of their respective customers. 
PNRs may include basic information such as 
a traveler’s itinerary, reservation history, and 
credit card data along with service-related 
information such as whether a traveler requested 
a special meal (e.g., kosher) and/or whether 
the traveler is traveling alone or with any 
companion(s). The TSA will compare PNR data 
with other governmental watch lists, including 
a “no-fly” list, to develop a passenger profi le.3
A remarkable profi le will prompt the TSA to 
identify a traveler as a “selectee” for secondary 
security screening. Profi ling of this nature invites 
debate of constitutional proportion.
Profiling system critics voice three 
principal concerns about Secure Flight. 
First, privacy advocates and civil libertarians 
contend that profi ling systems such as Secure 
Flight are extreme. Would-be terrorists with 
grandiose Sept. 11-like intentions constitute a 
discrete minority of the traveling population. 
Accordingly, Secure Flight will not be the least 
intrusive security alternative because it will 
intrude into the privacy of the overwhelming 
majority of airline passengers, namely benign 
millions of law-abiding citizens who pose 
no aviation security threat. Second, profi ling 
systems arguably deprive travelers of control 
over their personal information.  In constructing 
a passenger profi le and threat assessment, the 
federal government refuses to disclose precisely 
what information it will rely upon. Only the 
government knows the source of profi ling data, 
which some profi ling system critics argue may 
include information contained in untrustworthy 
commercial databases having nothing to do 
with airline travel. Further, it is unclear how 
the TSA will avoid and/or remedy profi ling 
errors caused by mistaken identity, identity 
theft, fraud, or otherwise. Finally, intentionally 
or not, profiling systems may promote an 
unconstitutional categorization of travelers into 
ethnic, racial, and/or religious groupings. Instead 
of accepting the presumption that everyone is an 
equal security risk, airline passenger profi ling 
systems may cater to a post-Sept. 11 prejudice 
against certain types of travelers, in particular 
passengers from the Middle East (von Rochow-
Leuschner, 2004). For many profi ling system 
critics, the government cannot be trusted 
to design egalitarian machinery that is so 
disciplined as to be blind to the fact that all of the 
Sept. 11 terrorists were of a related and distinct 
ethnic, geo-cultural, and/or religious background 
(Baker, 2002; Banks, 2004; Chandrasekhar, 
2003; Derbyshire, 2001; McDonald, 2002).
In the final analysis, the Secure Flight 
initiative supposes that the events of Sept. 11 
could have been prevented or at least contested. 
This article accepts that premise and supports 
the federal effort to pre-screen airline passengers 
more thoroughly. In doing so, this article surveys 
and does not dismiss important countervailing 
constitutional and practical considerations 
to profiling. Last, this article offers some 
recommendations on how TSA policy should 
evolve to account for these concerns while 
advancing efforts to preempt terrorist plots 
involving the United States commercial airline 
system.
WHO IS THE ENEMY?
The initial questions borne of Sept. 11 were 
“what happened?” and “who did this?” These 
questions are resolved (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). 
The secondary inquiry of what, if anything, can be 
done to identify and preempt future perpetrators 
remains open. To answer this question, federal 
aviation security policy makers assume that 
terrorists have identifiable characteristics or 
behavioral patterns that are different from other 
airline passengers. Profi ling systems are sensible 
in this context because they distinguish “them” 
from “us” and “good” from “bad,” collecting as 
much information as possible about terrorists 
who maneuver among otherwise law-abiding 
airline passengers. Profi ling systems such as 
Secure Flight, however, generate serious and 
divergent commentary challenging why “good” 
Americans themselves must be investigated as 
if they are a part of a terrorist threat.
The effectiveness of a profiling system 
intended to secure Americans and their rights 
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may require some contradictory impingement 
of the Constitution itself. The end of secure 
commercial airplane flight may necessitate 
undesirable means, particularly the abridgment 
of certain rights if only in the short term. It is 
not unreasonable or unwise to extrapolate from 
what is known. Future terrorists may be similar to 
those involved on Sept. 11. Therefore, profi ling 
in terms of ethnicity, political agenda, race and/
or religious affi liation has utility (Derbyshire, 
2001; McDonald, 2002). Any federal systematic 
consideration of these attributes to enforce 
domestic airline security, however, is anathema 
to the Constitution and its corresponding 
freedom to travel (Baker, 2002; Banks, 2004; 
Chandrasekhar, 2003; Reser, 1998). Aviation 
security policy makers also must imagine threats 
from so-far unrevealed sources. The TSA must 
forecast that future terrorists are outside the Sept. 
11 terrorist profi le. Consequently, every airline 
passenger poses potential danger. The practice 
of the federal government targeting a substantial 
subset of its population (i.e., airline passengers), 
however, also is antithetical to the ideals of both 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Thus, the 
paramount questions about profi ling systems are 
whether and how it is possible for the federal 
government to balance airline security measures 
with constitutional privacy considerations. The 
answers are as polarized as these questions 
suggest. 
Profiling systems such as Secure Flight 
promote a zero-tolerance philosophy that the 
government should do whatever is necessary 
to prevent a Sept. 11-like event from occurring. 
The U.S. Constitution requires more balance 
and moderation. Secure Flight must be a 
proportional reaction to the terrorism of Sept. 
11 and must perform within the confi nes of the 
Constitution.  
One way to assess whether a profiling 
system is constitutionally acceptable is to 
examine the magnitude of operational errors that 
invariably may occur. The anecdotal evidence 
of unnecessary interrogations triggered by 
existing profi ling systems is discouraging in 
this context. For example, an airline passenger 
from Kentucky was stopped 22 different times 
by the TSA, FBI, and Secret Service because his 
name is the same as that of an apparent fi nancier 
of Al Qaeda. This experience, compounded by 
the evolving danger of identity theft, emphasizes 
actual perils of computerized profi ling systems. 
Errors occur, but are not always remedied 
effectively. The U.S. General Accounting 
Office specifically determined that the TSA 
failed to address issues of database accuracy, 
operational safeguards to protect system abuse, 
security measures to protect unauthorized system 
access, and passenger redress (U.S. General 
Accounting Offi ce, 2004). Standing alone, these 
issues are important. These issues do not exist 
in a vacuum, however, but instead are relative 
to and tempered by the fact that the predecessor 
screening system to Secure Flight successfully 
identifi ed nine of the 19 Sept. 11 terrorists. It 
is another matter that the only consequence of 
identifi cation was detention of the terrorists’ 
baggage until the terrorists themselves boarded 
the doomed airplanes. The developing story of 
Secure Flight, therefore, is about a struggle to 
determine an acceptable level of personal and 
societal costs brought by new security regimes 
(AuBuchon, 1999; Daniel, 2002; Kite, 2004; 
Miller, 2003; Rhee, 2000; Rosenzweig, 2004; 
Spencer, 2002).
HISTORY OF AIRLINE PASSENGER 
PROFILING
The degree to which federal aviation policies 
reasonably interfere with personal rights, if at all, 
is measured against the Constitution. The Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution 
specifi cally is the interface of the competing, but 
similarly esteemed, ideals of national security 
and personal privacy. The Fourth Amendment 
provides:
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affi rmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.4
There is little practicality in obtaining a 
search warrant for every airline passenger who 
passes through an airport terminal. Consequently, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fi nds curious 
application in the context of airline and airport 
130
Airline Passenger Profi ling Systems
security. For example, boarding gate searches via 
metal detectors called magnetometers are court-
sanctioned procedures that proportionally and 
defensibly intrude on personal liberty in favor 
of public safety and welfare. As one U.S. Court 
of Appeals reasoned:
 . . . the search for the sole purpose of 
discovering weapons and preventing 
air piracy, and not for the purpose of 
discovering weapons and precriminal 
events, fully justifi ed the minimal 
invasion of personal privacy by 
magnetometer.  The use of the device, 
unlike frisking, cannot possibly 
be “an annoying, frightening, and 
perhaps humiliating experience, . . .”5
Searching airline passengers by profi ling 
may be different, however, and so has received 
different treatment. Unlike magnetometers, 
airline passenger profi ling intends to discover 
indicia of precriminal events that would expose 
selected travelers to further examination. 
Whatever its legality, airline passenger profi ling 
is not new, fi nding precedent in earlier federal 
security measures designed to prevent air 
piracy.
Terrorism has tempered the freedom to 
travel throughout the history of commercial 
aviation (Reser, 1998). For example, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
long regulated passenger profi ling. The FAA 
mandated passenger profi ling as a fundamental 
part of airline security in the 1960s, an active 
period of commercial aircraft hijackings. The 
FAA’s “Anti-Air Hijack Profi le” established 
approximately 25 characteristics empirically 
linked with those of past hijackers.6 The 
purpose of this passenger screening system was 
to identify personal attributes that, if possessed 
by a traveler, would entitle security operators 
to examine that traveler’s carry-on luggage 
by X-ray or otherwise. The FAA ultimately 
abandoned hijacker-related profi ling in 1972 in 
favor of global security checkpoints and X-rays 
of all carry-on luggage. The threat of hijackings 
and terror, however, did not abate and the need 
for profi ling systems regenerated years later.  
On July 17, 1996, the need for passenger 
screening reemerged, catalyzed by the 
disaster of TWA Flight 800. A trans-Atlantic 
Boeing 747, TWA Flight 800 exploded while 
climbing over the coast of New York. The 
disaster occurred because of a defective fuel 
tank. Survivors suspected terrorism as the 
cause-in-fact. On this mistaken suspicion, 
on August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton 
directed the development of the “White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security” 
(Gore Commission). The Gore Commission was 
charged with “develop[ing] and recommend[ing] 
to the President a strategy designed to improve 
aviation safety and security, both domestically 
and internationally.”7 On Feb. 17, 1997, the 
Gore Commission issued its fi nal report, making 
several security-related recommendations among 
which was the reintroduction of passenger 
profi ling (Hahn 1997). The Gore Commission 
identifi ed three ways in which to improve and 
promote 1960s-era passenger profi ling:
First, FBI, CIA, and [Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms] should evaluate 
and expand the research into known 
terrorists, hijackers, and bombers 
needed to develop the best possible 
profi ling system.  They should keep 
in mind that such a profi le would be 
most useful to the airlines if it could be 
matched against automated passenger 
information which the airlines maintain.  
Second, the FBI and CIA should 
develop a system that would allow 
important intelligence information on 
known or suspected terrorists to be 
used in passenger profiling without 
compromising the integrity of the 
intelligence or its sources.  Third, the 
Commission will establish an advisory 
board on civil liberties questions that 
arise from the development and use 
of profiling systems (White House 
Commission, 1997).
From this, the FAA advanced its efforts 
to develop a computer-assisted passenger 
screening program, the precursor to Secure 
Flight.
CAPPS I
The fi rst-generation computer airline passenger 
profi ling system was developed by Northwest 
Airlines in 1996 under a grant from the FAA. 
After testing a prototype, Northwest Airlines 
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released the profiling software to other 
airlines through the FAA in December, 1997. 
The profi ling software operated through the 
internal computer reservation system of each 
airline.  Known as the “Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System” (CAPPS), 
this initial system effected the concept that 
data collection is power  (Nehf, 2003; Solove, 
2002). CAPPS collects approximately 39 pieces 
of pre-boarding data that, both on a random and 
an intentional basis, identify travelers who 
should be subjected to heightened security 
procedures. Significantly, to the distress 
of privacy advocates, CAPPS profiles are 
confi dential (Nojeim, 1998; Rosenzweig, 2004; 
Smith, 1998). The confi dentiality of CAPPS 
profi ling criteria underscores the ever-present 
tension between national security pressures and 
constitutional guarantees (AuBuchon, 1999; 
Crandall, 2002; Kearns, 1999; Smith, 1998).  As 
one commentator (Rhee, 2000) noted, “[m]aking 
profi les public is necessary to make them legal, 
however, doing so would also destroy their 
usefulness.” 
While the government will not disclose 
any criterion upon which a CAPPS profi le is 
constructed, certain elements of the system are 
known with some confi dence. Some observers 
of airline security (Nojeim, 1998) believe that 
CAPPS tracks several aspects of passenger 
conduct:
• method of payment for an airline ticket (i.e., 
cash or credit); 
• the timing of a purchase (i.e., immediately 
before departure or in advance); 
• the identity of travelers, including with 
whom, if anybody, the passenger is 
traveling;
• the activity at the destination, including 
whether the passenger intends to rent a 
car;
• the flight itinerary, including where the flight 
originates and its ultimate destination;
• the passenger’s specific travel plans, 
including ultimate destination when 
different than the flight upon which the 
traveler is aboard; and 
• whether the flight is round trip or one-
way.  
A traveler identifi ed by CAPPS as a “selectee” 
is subject to secondary screening:
Depending on the destination of 
the passenger (domestic or foreign) 
and the availability of advanced 
technology at particular airports, the 
additional security measure applied 
to selectees typically will involve one 
of the following: bag matching (the 
requirement that checked luggage be 
flown only if it is determined that the 
passenger who checked the luggage has 
boarded the airplane); examination by 
a certifi ed explosive detection system 
(EDS); or examination using other 
advanced technology (such as explosive 
detection device or a trace detector) 
(U.S. Department of Justice 1997). 
Curiously, this security regime likely would not 
have prevented the fi rst documented bombing 
of a commercial airliner in the United States. 
That event occurred in 1955 when a passenger’s 
son covertly packed a bomb in the passenger’s 
luggage to collect insurance policy proceeds 
(Daniel, 2002; Smith, 1998). The unsuspecting 
passenger boarded the fateful flight without 
drawing any additional security screening. The 
effectiveness of profi ling systems in the possible 
circumstance that innocent passengers are 
manipulated for sinister purposes is dubious.
Therefore, profiling invites significant 
criticism along operational grounds.  CAPPS 
critics contend that the methodology used to 
profi le airline passengers for further screening 
is over-inclusive, flagging up to half of all 
passengers yet missing vital targets (Rosenzweig, 
2004). Profi ling system opponents also contend 
that such systems simply do not work. For 
example, profi ling by the U.S. Customs Service 
has not stopped the drug trade (Nojeim, 1998). 
In 1999, the FAA responded to this and other 
criticism by limiting the use of CAPPS profi les 
to baggage screening, abandoning the practice 
of subjecting selectees to personal searches and 
questioning. Concerns remained, however, about 
whose baggage was searched and why.
The U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) (2001) stated affi rmatively that CAPPS 
variables “are not based on the race, ethnicity, 
religion or gender of passengers.” In an earlier 
assessment, the Gore Commission enumerated 
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several safeguards to ensure such objectivity of 
airline passenger profi ling systems:
• Profi les should not include information of a 
constitutionally suspect nature such as race, 
religion, or national origin;
• Factors should be verifi able data that are 
proven to predict risk;
• Strict limits should be set on dissemination 
of profi le records, and a system should be 
established for passengers to challenge 
the accuracy of personally identifiable 
information;
• An independent panel should be set up to 
monitor the system and make sure no civil 
liberties are abridged; and
• Profi ling should be continued only until 
effective explosive-detection systems are 
developed (White House Commission, 
1997).
The Gore Commission elaborated that:
[f]actors to be considered for elements of 
the profi le should be based on measurable, 
verifi able data indicating that the factors 
chosen are reasonable predictors of 
risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. 
A relationship must be demonstrated 
between the factors chosen and the risk 
of illegal activity . . . Procedures for 
searching the person or luggage of, or 
for questioning, a person who is selected 
by the automated profi ling system should 
be premised on insuring respectful, non-
stigmatizing, and effi cient treatment of all 
passengers (Ibid.).
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
reviewed the selection criteria in CAPPS and 
opined that CAPPS did not “discriminate 
unlawfully against passengers” or include 
passenger traits such as names or mode of dress 
that might be directly associated with race, 
ethnicity, or religion (U.S. Department of Justice 
1997). The DOJ concluded that CAPPS would 
not have a “disparate impact on any group of 
passengers” (Ibid). Profi ling system opponents, 
however, found the Gore Commission’s stated 
goals specious and the DOJ’s conclusions 
unbelievable.
The chief criticism of CAPPS — a criticism 
leveled with equal force against forthcoming 
profi ling systems — relates to the confi dentiality 
of the data relied upon to construct passenger 
profiles. Profiling system critics protest the 
lack of transparency of CAPPS data as well as 
the source, integrity, and potential for misuse 
of such information. Some CAPPS opponents 
specifi cally warn about the dissemination of 
CAPPS profi les to other governmental agencies 
for purposes unrelated to terrorism or aviation 
security. The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) argues:
By its very nature, the computerized 
profi ling system runs afoul of a central 
principle of privacy: Information given 
for one purpose ought not to be used for 
other purposes without the consent of 
the person to whom it pertains. People 
book a flight, or enroll in a frequent 
flyer program, not because they want 
to yield up data about themselves for a 
massive profi ling system, but because 
they want to travel, and occasionally, 
travel for free.
The computerized profiling 
system relies on the wealth of data 
airlines collect about passengers 
for reasons other than profiling. 
Information airlines collect about their 
passengers includes name, address, 
the destinations to which a passenger 
flies with a particular airline, how the 
passenger paid for their tickets and who 
may have purchased the tickets for the 
passenger, the people with whom the 
passenger has traveled, whether the 
passenger booked onward travel such 
as a car or hotel, and other information. 
This personal data needs to be protected 
(Nojeim, 1998).
To protect airline passenger privacy without a 
corresponding decline in aviation security, the 
ACLU imagines security measures alternative to 
profi ling, including training security personnel to 
identify tangible evidence of suspected criminal 
activity on reasonable, articulable bases other 
than stereotypes; screening airline personnel 
and employees of air security vendors (within 
constitutional means); adding measures to 
enforce security standards at foreign airports; 
and limiting FBI and law-enforcement access 
to passenger records except pursuant to a court 
order based on probable cause of criminality 
(Ibid).  After Sept. 11, however, aviation 
  133
Airline Passenger Profi ling Systems
security policy makers moved to enhance 
CAPPS capabilities. 
CAPPS II
Described by senior government offi cials as the 
single most important component of the nation’s 
aviation security infrastructure (O’Harrow, 
Washington Post, August 27, 2004), CAPPS II 
was a post-Sept. 11 proposal to update CAPPS 
I.  CAPPS II intended to authenticate the identity 
of commercial airline passengers by checking 
each traveler’s PNR, including full name, home 
address, telephone number and date of birth, 
against governmental databases for security 
assessment. CAPPS II would bridge airline 
passenger profi ling systems to law enforcement 
and intelligence databases. As one publication 
reports (CMP TechWeb, Sept. 3, 2004), “CAPPS 
II would have notifi ed law-enforcement offi cials 
whenever the screening process turned up 
passengers with outstanding warrants against 
them, even for non-travel-related incidents.” 
As important, CAPPS II would use commercial
databases for counterterrorism purposes. The 
use of commercial databases would enable 
aviation security analysts to create a mosaic of 
information derived from a variety of sources 
(Kearns, 1999). These aggressive features, if 
implemented, would make more potent the 
federal government’s anti-terrorism efforts, 
which failed on Sept. 11. CAPPS II advocates 
understood the proposed system to be both a 
necessary overhaul of existing aviation security 
measures and an appropriately calibrated 
defensive measure. This rationale, however, 
met spirited opposition (DeGrave, 2004; von 
Rochow-Leuschner, 2004).
CAPPS II critics protested forcefully that, 
even acknowledging the magnitude of the 
terrorism of Sept. 11, CAPPS II would blunt 
Constitutional privacy rights to an intolerable 
degree. In an article on the expansiveness of 
CAPPS II (Wald and Schwartz, South Florida 
Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2004), several reporters 
relate a concern about “mission creep,” whereby 
information comprising an airline passenger 
profi le would unacceptably slip bit-by-bit into 
the hands of non-TSA governmental actors for 
uses unrelated to aviation security.Additionally, 
CAPPS II critics repeated their criticism of 
CAPPS I that the constitutional costs to liberty 
and privacy rights outweighed imagined or 
actual benefi ts of profi ling systems. CAPPS II 
opponents also publicized several embarrassing 
failures of CAPPS I. In September, 2004, British 
pop star Cat Stevens, who became a Muslim in 
the 1970s and today is known as Yusuf Islam, 
was evicted from an international flight bound 
for the United States. Stevens’ name was on 
the government’s “no-fly” list.  CAPPS I also 
identifi ed U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
(D-Mass.) and U.S. Representative Don Young 
(R-Alaska) for extra security scrutiny. The 
deepest criticism respecting CAPPS II related 
to the system’s proposed use of commercial 
data for law-enforcement purposes. As two 
commentators noted:
For example, if you do not buy the 
book Amazon.com recommended to 
you based on other customers’ buying 
patterns, the negative consequences are 
slight. If your credit card company puts 
a hold on the use of your card because 
it noticed an odd usage pattern and 
suspected someone might have stolen 
your card, you can explain and continue 
to use your card. But the consequences 
of using data for counterterrorism 
purposes can be much more serious. 
They can include arrest, deportation, 
loss of a job, greater scrutiny at 
various screening gates, investigation 
or surveillance, or being added to a 
watch list (Dempsey and Flint, 2004).
Eventually the crescendo of criticism by CAPPS 
II opponents reached the TSA, which offered to 
make several system modifi cations.  
The TSA suggested three significant 
amendments to the CAPPS II design. First, 
the TSA agreed to erase most passenger 
information in the CAPPS II system within 
a certain amount of days after passengers 
completed their scheduled travel. The TSA also 
proposed appellate mechanisms for passengers 
erroneously targeted for heightened, secondary 
security screening. Most important, the TSA 
proposed limiting the use of private commercial 
data to compose a traveler’s security profi le. In 
particular, the TSA proposed transmitting PNR 
information to commercial data providers solely 
for the purpose of authenticating a passenger’s 
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identity. Commercial data-miners, in turn, would 
evaluate whether a passenger is, in fact, who 
s/he represented when reserving a flight. Upon 
completion of this authentication process, the 
CAPPS II system would review a passenger’s 
commercial identity against intelligence and law 
enforcement databases. Passengers positively 
identifi ed without any corresponding matches 
with intelligence or law enforcement data would 
proceed to their flights. Those passengers with 
more remarkable profi les would be subjected to 
further search and/or law enforcement action. 
CAPPS II opponents viewed these measures as 
insuffi cient and CAPPS II never materialized.
CAPPS II was a marketing disaster apart 
from its substantive controversy.  By proceeding 
without notice or opportunity for meaningful 
public comment, the TSA did precisely 
what privacy advocates cautioned CAPPS II 
would do — deny citizens due process of the 
law. The private method in which CAPPS II 
developed aggravated privacy-related concerns 
that the federal government was undercutting 
the Constitution. This suspicion evolved 
into certainty when civil libertarians learned 
that some airlines assisted the government 
to develop CAPPS II. JetBlue Airways and 
Northwest Airlines voluntarily provided the 
TSA with lists of their respective passengers 
for testing in the CAPPS II system, hoping to 
secure the very airplane travel they sell. JetBlue 
Airways, for instance, provided a data-mining 
government contractor with approximately a 
million passenger records (including names, 
addresses, and phone numbers). A consumer-
research company ultimately evaluated these 
records, which included information about 
each passenger’s demographics, including 
occupation, income, gender, home-ownership 
and car-ownership history, and household 
composition. This transfer of information was 
effected without the knowledge or consent of the 
passengers whose identity was disclosed.  The 
airlines were sued as a result.8 The industry-
government collaboration of the CAPPS II 
program highlighted the depth of information 
available by marrying PNR data with commercial 
and law-enforcement databases. The industry-
government collaboration of the CAPPS II 
program also emboldened profiling system 
opponents. Ultimately, the TSA abandoned 
CAPPS II on July 13, 2004, after the U.S. 
General Accounting Offi ce reported that the 
TSA failed to meet related privacy concerns 
(U.S. General Accounting Offi ce 2004).
SECURE FLIGHT
In August, 2004, the TSA introduced “Secure 
Flight,” a next-generation CAPPS. Secure Flight 
is designed to implement the recommendation 
that government “no-fly” and “automatic 
selectee” lists be improved through a terrorist 
screening database (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
As one airline industry observer noted (Alonso-
Zaldivar, Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2004), 
“[a]bout 15% of the nearly two million domestic 
air travelers each day are now pulled aside for 
more intrusive searches.” “One of the goals of 
Secure Flight will be to bring down the rate of 
passengers selected for secondary screening . . 
. while effectively catching known or suspected 
terrorists” (Kim, Aviation Daily, Sept. 22, 2004). 
Secure Flight will be built upon the technology 
platform of its controversial predecessor, CAPPS 
II. The technical similarity between CAPPS II 
and Secure Flight encourages the contention 
that Secure Flight is, as one privacy advocate 
suggests (Scannell, USA Today, September 28, 
2004), nothing other than “a stripped-down 
version of the old CAPPS II system with a more 
consumer-friendly name.” 
The TSA promotes Secure Flight as different 
from predecessor profi ling systems, however. 
Secure Flight purportedly will access commercial 
databases only to confi rm the actual identity of 
a traveler and not to compute a risk score for 
purposes divorced from commercial aviation 
security. Additionally, the TSA proposes that 
Secure Flight will maintain an appellate process 
for travelers mistakenly or inequitably selected 
for secondary screening. Finally, the TSA 
proposes employing a passenger advocate to 
whom passengers could turn if they are unfairly 
flagged for heightened security treatment. 
Whether these features alleviate the concerns 
of privacy advocates and civil libertarians is 
still at issue (Kite, 2004).
Like CAPPS II, Secure Flight represents 
ongoing efforts by the executive branch 
of the federal government to involve itself 
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directly with aviation security after Sept. 11 
(Hessick 2002-2003). Secure Flight will shift 
passenger prescreening responsibilities from the 
privatized airlines to the federal government.9
Currently, airlines compare passenger names 
with government-provided terrorist watch 
lists. Certain sensitive government watch list 
information, however, is not available to airlines. 
To close this intelligence gap, Secure Flight 
will unify the process of comparing passenger 
identifi cation with government data by having the 
government alone make this comparison relative 
to the government’s own watch lists, including 
the Terrorist Screening Center Database 
(TSCD). In November, 2004, the TSA began 
testing Secure Flight by collecting historical 
passenger information and comparing that 
information with commercial data to determine 
the accuracy of passenger information and to 
resolve false positive matches against TSCD 
records. Therefore, privacy advocates contend 
that Secure Flight may be more invasive than 
CAPPS II.
Accordingly, Secure Flight generates the 
variety of constitutionally-based opposition 
that defeated the CAPPS II program. Through 
a request under the Freedom of Information 
Act, the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC), a Washington, D.C. based public 
interest group, demanded that the TSA produce 
documents that explained how or if the FBI 
intends to protect the privacy of travelers in 
the course of maintaining records in terrorist-
screening databases. EPIC’s specifi c critique is 
that profi ling systems such as Secure Flight deny 
airline passengers any judicially enforceable 
rights.  EPIC charges that:
Like its [CAPPS] predecessor, Secure 
Flight has been exempted from crucial 
provisions of the Privacy Act, which 
will severely limit the rights individuals 
typically would have in the personal 
information the government maintains 
about them. For instance, Secure Flight 
may collect and use personal information 
irrelevant and unnecessary for aviation 
security. Furthermore, passengers will 
have no judicially enforceable rights 
to access and correct the personal 
information maintained about them for 
the program. TSA assures the public, 
however, that “upon completion of 
the testing phase, and before Secure 
Flight is operational, TSA will establish 
comprehensive passenger redress 
procedures and personal data and civil 
liberties protections for the Secure 
Flight program.” No details about 
these protections are available, nor [is] 
information about how long TSA will 
keep the PNR data that it collects for 
Secure Flight, even though the agency 
intends to launch the program early 
next year.10
Notwithstanding this criticism, efforts to develop 
Secure Flight are proceeding.
On Nov, 12, 2004, after providing public 
notice and entering into a multi-million dollar 
contract with IBM Corp. to conduct testing, 
the TSA ordered more than 70 U.S. airlines to 
submit PNRs for the month of June, 2004. In an 
article examining the intrusiveness of profi ling 
systems (Hilkevitch, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 22, 
2004), one reporter writes that “CAPPS II . . . 
required the airlines to turn over only passenger 
names, dates of birth, home addresses and home 
telephone numbers . . . [whereas] Secure Flight 
mandates that the airlines provide the security 
agency with passenger name records for each 
traveler -- a document that contains 39 fi elds of 
information ranging from a passenger’s history 
of selecting pre-reserved seats to the identity of 
traveling companions.” Another source (Wald, 
International Herald Tribune, Sept. 23, 2004) 
elaborates that the data the TSA requested “varies 
from airline to airline . . . and may also include 
the names of others traveling in the same party, 
meal preference, whether the reservation was 
changed, the method of payment and comments 
of all types by airline employees on matters like 
whether a passenger was drunk or belligerent.”
With this data, the TSA expects to conclude 
Secure Flight testing in February, 2005, and, in 
March, 2005, the Government Accountability 
Offi ce is expected to report to Congress on the 
TSA’s plan to examine commercial data through 
Secure Flight.
136
Airline Passenger Profi ling Systems
CONCLUSION
The issue of passenger profi ling transcends the 
narrow topic of aviation security. Secure Flight 
and its predecessor profi ling systems animate 
a philosophical tension in American society, 
disrupting the theoretical constitutional fault-line 
of liberty and order. Americans equate liberty 
and privacy with a right to avoid the public gaze 
and to be let alone (Warren and Brandeis 1890). 
Democratic and utilitarian impulses, meanwhile, 
encourage individual sacrifi ce for the greater 
good, e.g., national security. Whether national 
security and privacy are equivalent concerns is 
debatable.  
The relative importance of personal liberty 
and societal security is contextual. While the 
federal government is stimulated to preempt 
terrorism, the urgency that motivates Secure 
Flight dissipates over time as Americans 
normalize their lives and return to routines 
after Sept. 11 (Daniel, 2001-2002). Today, 
increasingly, Americans greet successively 
intrusive national security measures by the 
federal government with an “anti-anti-terrorism” 
sentiment that is based upon concerns about 
an ever-expanding executive and a “fear of 
technology” (Rosenzweig, 2004).  Some citizens 
“equate the potential for abuse of Executive 
Branch authority with the existence of actual 
abuse,” considering “any expansion of executive 
authority, notwithstanding the potential for 
benign and benefi cial results, because they judge 
the potential for the abuse of power to outweigh 
the benefi ts gained” (Ibid). The TSA’s promise to 
remedy profi ling system mistakes after-the-fact 
is no promise for many Americans. For privacy 
advocates and civil libertarians, the idea of 
federal government access to airline passengers’ 
personal commercial data is problematic in 
the first instance. As one DOT official said 
(Podberesky, 2004), “many on the outside feel 
that the government cannot monitor its own 
activities.” The interplay of liberty and order 
is so delicate and fundamental that, whatever 
the events of Sept. 11, it is diffi cult to envision 
an adaptation of Secure Flight or similar airline 
passenger profi ling system that harmonizes these 
two ideals. 
The events of Sept. 11 mandate better 
security-related intelligence, however. 
Intelligence services should gather and share 
more information to effectuate this end 
(Kreimer, 2004). Secure Flight is consistent 
with this objective. Information networking 
vis-à-vis airline passenger profi ling is a clear, 
limited, context-specifi c societal objective that, 
in a post-Sept. 11 environment, legitimately 
rivals private interests. As one scholar notes 
(Nehf, 2003), to best protect privacy rights 
generally, “in the modern digital world, 
information privacy should be viewed as a 
societal value justifying a resolution in the 
public interest, much like environmental policy 
and other societal concerns, with less emphasis 
on individual self-policing and market-based 
mechanisms.” As to Secure Flight specifi cally, 
the TSA must do more to publicize the merits 
of its proposed profi ling system so that citizens 
have confi dence in it and their rights relative 
to it. To date, however, Secure Flight develops 
at a distance from airline passengers, through 
technical legal papers, narrow communication 
channels, and uninviting bureaucracy. The TSA 
should engage American citizens to participate 
in national security programs actively. 
In place of paternalism, the TSA might 
create a collaborative approach to national 
aviation security. This can be done if the TSA 
provides tangible travel-related benefits in 
exchange for voluntary sacrifi ce on the traveler’s 
part. As part of any aviation security campaign, 
the federal government might look more closely 
at the recommendations of private actors in the 
commercial aviation industry. For example, the 
Air Transport Association supports expansion 
of the government’s “Registered Traveler” 
program, which is being tested at airports in 
Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and 
Washington, D.C. Registered Traveler invites 
participants to submit to a background check 
voluntarily and to provide security agents with 
their birth date, phone number, address, and a 
biometric identifi er (e.g., fi ngerprint or iris scan). 
In return, registered airline passengers may avoid 
checkpoints and/or extra screening. Passengers 
who do not want to give up their privacy need 
not fly commercially (Crandall, 2002).
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In the final analysis, the TSA’s 
proposed profi ling system divides Americans 
philosophically. This is evidenced (Air Safety 
Week, October 11, 2004) by the reactions of two 
American citizens to Secure Flight:
• Matthew Belmonte, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology: “TSA’s plan to 
compel United States airlines to produce 
old passenger name record data would, 
if implemented, be an unfair invasion of 
passengers’ privacy, since those passengers 
who chose to fly during the period in 
question [June 2004] could not have been 
aware that their personal details would be 
released in this manner. Passengers expect 
privacy . . . TSA’s continued plan to use 
information from commercial databases 
remains worrisome, since most commercial 
databases offer no easy way for individuals 
to examine and to correct information 
pertaining to them.”
• Mitchell Stern, SeaGate Travel, Baltimore, 
Md.: “As a global travel director . . . I am 
all for Secure Flight. From a privacy aspect, 
I have no concern that would override the 
program objective to provide an enhanced, 
more secure transportation system in 
America.11
Within this debate, the U.S. government has 
made a defi nite choice, allowing national security 
concerns to overtake privacy interests by some 
measure. Of course, citizens must not abandon a 
corresponding right and duty to protect, protest, 
and effectuate change to the extent constitutional 
conceptions of privacy and civil liberties are 
impinged. Airline passenger profi ling systems 
do not purport to be panaceas for security-
related vulnerabilities of the commercial airline 
industry. Instead, they are but one, vital element 
in a coordinated defense against tangible threats 
to American lives. 
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